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INTRODUCTION
This paper considers the research question: how  
can business organisations manage complexity 
simply on a comprehensive and reliable basis? 
More specifically, we ask: is the current dominant 
architecture of businesses as centralised command 
and control hierarchies the best fit to allow 
complexity to be sufficiently simplified so that 
humans with limited data processing abilities can 
reliably manage complexity?
The methodology involves using elements of 
complexity theory. According to Andrus,1 complexity 
theory is based on ‘four significant theoretical building 
blocks’: general system theory;2 information theory;3 
chaos theory,4 and fractal theory.5 
Subsumed into these building blocks is what 
Wiener,6 an MIT mathematician, described as 
‘Cybernetics’. French physicist and mathematician 
Governance scientists Dr Shann 
Turnbull and Prof James Guthrie AM 
use stakeholder firms to illustrate 
how to simplify the management of 
complexity and use natural laws to 
transform corporations into common 
good enterprises to counter global 
existential risks.   
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Ampère, first coined the word ‘cybernetique’ 
in his 1834 essay to describe the science of civil 
government.7 This topic has taken centuries to 
develop with contributions in the 20th and 21st by 
respectively Smuts8 and Turnbull9 and in this article.10 
The word cybernetics is based on the Greek 
for ‘steersman’ or ‘governor’. Wiener11 defined 
cybernetics as, ‘the science of control and 
communication in the animal and the machine’.12  
As pointed out by Ashby,13 a London neurologist, 
‘The truths of cybernetics are not conditional on 
being their being derived from some other branch  
of science’. 
Beer14 pioneered the application of cybernetics to 
management and developed his concept of ‘Viable 
Systems Management’ (VSM). Another name for 
cybernetic analysis was ‘operations research’15 or 
‘systems’ thinking.16 Beer advised17 Turnbull that he 
had never extended VSM to include governance 
variables. This is understandable. The first textbook 
on corporate governance was not published until 
198418. As President of the World Organisation 
of Systems and Cybernetics, Beer encouraged 
Turnbull to contribute to the cybernetic literature 
that resulted in Turnbull’s framework for designing 
sustainable urban communities.19 
Shannon’s contribution20 to complexity theory 
was as a Bell Telephone engineer. Shannon was 
concerned with the engineering problems of 
transmitting communication signals without error. 
In the second paragraph of his seminal article, 
he makes it clear that he was not concerned 
with the usual meaning of the word ‘information’ 
that communicates meaning. Shannon was only 
concerned with the accuracy of communicating  
data that can be measured in ‘bits’, which, in turn, 
could communicate meaning if errors did not arise  
in the data.
Bits are perturbations in the matter and energy that 
make a difference. To avoid ambiguity, this paper 
will use the more common term of ‘bytes’ that 
represents eight bits of data. In contemporary times 
many electronic devices routinely report the volume 
data in units of bytes that devices may receive, 
process, store, or transmit. This development 
provides a basis for empirical research using bytes  
as the unit of analysis that did not exist when 
theories of the firm were being developed.
Information is data that provides meaning to an 
observer. However, different observers of identical 
data may obtain radically different meanings. 
Information is a social construct that cannot be 
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reliably defined and so measured in physical units. 
Other related social constructs are ‘knowledge’ and 
‘wisdom’. Knowledge can be simplistically described 
as how to use information; wisdom can be described 
as when to use knowledge. While information, 
knowledge, and wisdom cannot be metered, no 
change in their status or distribution can occur 
without the transaction of bytes. 
Transaction Byte Analysis (TBA), developed by 
Turnbull,21 provides a basis for grounding aspects 
of the social sciences in the natural sciences. This 
is because no interaction between any living things 
can occur without the transaction of bytes. Also, 
the emergence of any information, knowledge or 
wisdom within or between living things requires 
the transaction of bytes.22 The creation, nature, and 
characteristics of living things are determined by 
the bytes embedded in their DNA and how these 
interact with their environment. These interactions 
generate instincts and behaviour patterns to 
survive birth and dynamic unknowable complex 
environments. TBA can be used to explain why 
DNA embeds complex contrary behaviour into 
creatures as the most efficient way to generate 
variety to allow them to survive birth and become 
self-governing in complex environments. TBA  
has also been used to establish ‘The science  
of corporate governance’, and more generally  
‘the science of governance’.23 
The British Telecom research laboratories pioneered 
measuring the capacity of humans to transact bytes 
by our five senses of touch, taste, smell, sound 
and sight.24 Kurzweil,25 an MIT speech recognition 
scientist, identified the neurological limits for our 
brains to receive, store, process, and transmit bytes. 
These limits identify the degree to which complexity 
needs to be simplified, to allow individuals of any 
species to survive and thrive in dynamic complex 
unknowable environments reliably.
As noted by Simon,26 in the first words of his 
seminal essay on The Architecture of Complexity: 
‘There are some properties common to many 
complex systems’. Their emergence in biology can 
be explained from the need to economise bytes 
and so the materials and energy needed to create 
and maintain life. The ability of innate materials to 
learn how to reproduce their patterns of energy 
and materials with adaptive variations to create and 
maintain reproducible life crucially depends upon 
a sustainable data memory and data processing 
capability. The human brain vividly illustrates the 
importance of the need to economise bytes to 
minimise data processing materials and energy. 
While our brains may be only two per cent of our 
body weight, they surprisingly consume ten times 
more energy than the rest of the body.27 Ashby28 
notes: ‘The gene-pattern, as a store of channel 
variety, has limited capacity. Survival goes especially 
to those species that use the capacity efficiently’. 
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Simon29 used probability analysis to explain in 
awkward language how the complexity of life 
needed to be created from ‘sub-assembles’, ‘stable 
intermediate forms’, ‘able to maintain their own 
existence’, and in ‘nearly decomposable systems  
in which interactions among the sub-systems are 
weak, but not negligible’. Introducing the concept 
described by Koestler30 as a ‘Holon’, allows the 
awkward language used by Simon to be dispensed 
with as is explained in the following section.
Words are the tools of thinking. New words are 
required to introduce new ideas. Complexity theory 
introduces the need for adopting new words to 
create parsimony in thinking, to facilitate analysis and 
communication. There is also the need a need to 
use established words in different ways to describe 
processes found in complexity theory. Examples are 
described by Andrus,31 who describes six processes 
of complexity theory with the words: (1) self-
organisation; (2) emergence; (3) relationships;  
(4) feedback; (5) adaptability, and (6) non-linearity. 
Other processes could be added. But some crucial 
missing concepts are: ‘tensegrity’, ‘holon’, and 
‘holarchy’. These introduce powerful explanatory 
concepts for understanding, evaluating, and managing 
complexity. A search of the titles, abstracts, and 
keywords of over 861,000 articles archived in the 
Social Science Research Network suggests that these 
concepts have not become widely recognised as 
being part of complexity theory. Alternatively, there 
exist the possibility that authors have neglected to 
highlight these words and/or have used different 
words to describe similar concepts. The awkward 
language used by Simon,32 and as identified with 
other authors by Mathews33 provide examples. 
Mathews in turn does not use the word ‘Tensegrity’ 
but this is what he is referring to in describing 
the defining features of Holons. Instead Mathews 
refers to Holons possessing: ‘Centralisation/
decentralisation’; ‘Bottom-up/top-down’; 
‘Autonomous/integrated’; and ‘Order/Ambiguity’.34 
To fill or explain this apparent gap in complexity 
theory, the following section discusses tensegrity, 
holons, and holarchy. The third section considers  
the limitations of managing complex activities in 
public, private, non-profit, or government sectors 
using hierarchies. The fourth section describes 
network organisations and considers their ability  
to simplify the management of complexity reliably. 
The concluding section identifies why and how 
elements of an ecological form of governance  
could be introduced in practice.
TENSEGRITY, HOLONS, AND HOLARCHY
Tensegrity
This word describes how seemingly opposite 
or contrary characteristics or forces may be 
complementary, interconnected, and interdependent. 
Neuroscientists Kelso and Engstrøm35 describe  
how nature, in the form of DNA, hard-wires 
humans to be both competitive~cooperative, 
selfish~generous, suspicious~trusting, and so on. 
Kelso and Engstrøm introduced the tilde ‘~’  
symbol to indicate such relationships. 
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Buckminster Fuller36 combined the words ‘Tension’ 
and ‘Integrity’ to create the word ‘Tensegrity’. The 
compression and tension struts of Fuller’s geodesic 
domes, allows the greatest area to be covered by 
the least weight of materials. Like geodesic domes 
tensegrity allows humans to obtain a ‘requisite 
variety’ 37 of communication and control responses 
using the least amount of data processing materials 
and energy to transact bytes to survive complexity. 
Not many stable, let alone dynamic structures 
could be constructed from just all the bones in a 
human body that performs best in compression. 
Likewise, for all the muscles in a human body 
that best perform in tension. Combining these 
contrary~complementary types of materials results 
in radically different characteristics to emerge  
for the whole system. Harvard biologist Ingber38 
described tensegrity as ‘The architecture of life’.
Tensegrity allows DNA to efficiently transmit 
and generate a requisite variety of complexity 
for the survival of its reproduction in complex 
environments. While computers now exceed 
human abilities in data processing, they have not yet 
matched the compactness, energy efficiency and 
mobility of human neurological data processing.
Bohm,39 a quantum physicist, suggested that 
tensegrity is the architecture of the universe. 
Photons of light exhibit properties of being either 
a particle or a wave. Similar duality exists with 
quantum states of ‘superposition’.40 Tensegrity 
generates variety. Evolutionary processes require 
variety to generate complexity. A simple example 
of how variety can be generated from identical 
sub-components with contrary~complementary 
characteristics is illustrated by the periodic table 
of all known atomic elements. Each element is 
created from different combinations of three sub-
components call protons, neutrons, and electrons.
Tensegrity creates the most efficient way to 
either create or survive complexity. It reflects the 
ancient Chinese idea of Yin and Yang, providing a 
healthy life. It is a feature that could improve the 
health, efficiency, resiliency, and survivability of 
organisations, yet management theorists and most 
practitioners have neglected it, despite its benefits. 
Tensegrity radically challenges a mindset seeking to 
promote cooperation, teamwork, and accountability 
only upwards, and control only downwards.
Holons and holarchy
Protons represent ‘holons’ that are simultaneously 
a ‘whole’ and a ‘part’. Protons represent a ‘whole’ 
of its sub-atomic particles described as ‘quarks’ and 
‘gluons’.41 Protons, in turn, become a ‘part’ of an 
atom. Different atoms, in turn, combine to form 
different types of molecules. The proton’s sub-
atomic particles, protons, and the atoms they create 
form a ‘holarchy’. A holarchy is quite different from a 
command and control hierarchy because its holonic 
parts can exist independently and in turn reproduce 
contrary~complementary characteristics.
A defining feature of holons is that they possess 
tensegrity. Holons also possess relative autonomy 
of the system of which they are a part. They 
demonstrate tensegrity by also possessing 
system dependence. As a result of their 
autonomy~dependence, no part of the system 
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will possess complete information about any other 
part.42 Holons can exhibit various forms of tensegrity 
by combining opposite characteristics not found in 
hierarchies like centralisation~decentralisations and 
top-down~bottom-up characteristics. Mathews43 
describes how holons may undertake different 
functions at different levels of a holarchy. Some 
determine ‘what holon do’, others, ‘how their tasks 
are combined’ or ‘why some tasks are accomplished 
and not others’.
Concepts illustrated by VISA Inc.
Dee Hock, the founding Chief Executive Officer 
of the VISA International credit card organisation 
invented his name for holons by combining the 
words ‘chaos’ and ‘order’ to create the word 
‘chaord’. Hock44 defined a chaord in two ways:
1. Any self-organising, self-governing, adaptive, 
nonlinear, complex organism, organisation, 
community or system, whether physical biological 
or social, the behaviour of which harmoniously 
blends characteristics of both chaos and order.
2. An entity whose behaviour exhibits observable 
patterns and probabilities not governed or  
explained by the rules that govern or explain  
its constituent parts.
Hock described ‘chaordic’ in three ways:
1. The behaviour of any self-governing organism, 
organisation or system, which harmoniously  
blends characteristics of order and chaos.
2. Patterned in a way dominated by neither,  
chaos, or order.
3. Characteristic of the fundamental organising  
principle of evolution and nature.
VISA Inc was created by Hock in 1970 
as a producer~consumer cooperative of 
competing~cooperating US banks. The banks 
consumed the credit card services produced by 
VISA that was created by cooperating with their 
credit card competitors. Hock45 explained that the 
organisation ‘had multiple boards of directors within 
a single legal entity, none of which can be considered 
superior or inferior, as each has irrevocable authority 
and autonomy over a geographic or functional 
area’. Consistent with the observation above by 
Mathews,46 Hock observed: ‘No part knew the 
whole, the whole does not know all the parts, and 
none had any need to. The entity, like millions of 
other chaordic organisations, including those we  
call body, brain, forest, ocean and biosphere, was 
largely self-regulating’ .47 
In firms with only a single board, coordination 
between different functional and geographic 
activities requires delegation and the establishment 
of some form of formal or informal ‘matrix’48 
organisation. This requires executives responsible 
for the integration to increase their data processing, 
information, and knowledge. 
The significance of the observation by Hock and 
Mathews about the compartmentalisation of data 
results in a substantial reduction in the need for 
transacting, storing, and processing bytes, data, 
information, knowledge, and wisdom. Economising 
bytes provides ways to economise materials and 
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energy and also simplify complexity. Mathews49 
noted: ‘The reduction in data complexity, achieved 
by the holonic architecture is prodigious’. This is why 
the adoption of holonic communication and control 
architecture becomes a fundamental strategy for 
comprehensively and reliably simplifying complexity. 
Each participating bank had its VISA board to control 
the issue of credit cards that competed with all 
other participating banks cooperating in adopting 
a common name, brand, marketing, operating 
functions, and data processing. The competing 
banks cooperated in the appointment of ‘compound 
boards’ 50 to control the various common functions. 
Each bank represented a self-governing unit that  
in turn was part of a self-governing organisation 
subject to competitive~cooperative compound 
relationships. In these ways, the VISA organisation 
could be described in the words of the 
Ostroms51,52,53 and Ostrom and Allen54 as 
‘polycentric compound republics’.
Other stakeholder-controlled firms like the 
employee controlled John Lewis Partnership that 
has a board for each store in the UK and the 
stakeholder controlled Mondragón Corporacion 
Cooperativa (MCC) in Spain that has boards 
for each cooperative component, also meet the 
test of forming polycentric compound republics. 
These two firms, like VISA, possess numerous 
boards of directors and/or control centres creating 
distributed intelligence and a special type of network 
governance. Turnbull55 described this special type 
of network governance as ‘ecological’ because it 
represents the architecture of natural systems. 
Ecological governance is radically different from  
the hierarchical paradigm implicitly assumed by 
graduate schools of business, management, and 
government. Instead of relying only on top-down 
command and controls, ecological governance 
introduces competing~cooperative bottom-up 
direction and accountability, as indicated in Figure 
1. Refer to ‘Employee Assembly’, ‘Supply Forums’, 
‘Customer Councils’ and ‘Community Committees’ 
that also represent ‘Polycentric Republics’ as referred 
to above.
The human brain provides an illustration. Our brain 
has no Chief Executive Neuron.56 Different parts of 
the brain compete for decision-making dominance 
according to human internal existential needs and 
external risks and opportunities.57, 58, 59 Ecological 
governance explains how millions of very small-
brained ants can make complex decisions from the 
bottom up about when, where, and how to design, 
build, operate, and maintain their complex homes.60 
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FIGURE 1:61 Ecological governance described by Ostrom can make corporations a 'common good' 
benefiting all stakeholders as sought by worlds’ biggest investor (Fink 2018)
Separation of governance powers from management allows independent bottom-up and outside-in 
stakeholder intelligence to integrate governance into Corporate Social Responsibilities to monitor and 
control misconduct. Systemic contestability of decisions protects and nurtures with less costs the interests 
of stakeholders, the firm, and society.
61. Developed by the author in various forms from ‘Figure 5, Stakeholder council’, in: S. Turnbull, ‘Best practise in the Governance of GBEs’, in J. Guthrie (ed.), 
Making the Australian Public Sector Count in the 1990’s, Sydney, IIR Conferences, 1995, p. 105
For publicly traded, large private firms, non profits and government corporations 
to make shareholders and regulators responsible for the wellbeing of stakeholders
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Holonic governance in nature and society
Field Marshal Jan Smuts62 was the first to note the 
holonic architecture of natural systems. He wrote 
his book Holism and Evolution between being Prime 
Minister of South Africa on two occasions. His 
biographer, Crafford,63 described his ideas in the 
following way:
It had very much in common with his 
philosophy of life as subsequently developed 
and embodied in his Holism and Evolution. 
Small units must develop into bigger wholes, 
and they in their turn again must grow into 
larger and ever-larger structures without 
cessation. Advancement lay along that path. 
Thus the unification of the four provinces in the 
Union of South Africa, the idea of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations, and, finally, the 
great whole resulting from the combination 
of the peoples of the earth in a great league 
of nations were but a logical progression 
consistent with his philosophical tenets.
The nested networks of stakeholder governed 
cooperative in the Basque area of Spain, described 
at the MCC grew similarly by combing smaller units, 
a process extended to a global level by Turnbull.64, 65 
Simon66 explained the advantage of this approach. 
He used probability analysis to suggest how the 
complexity of life could have been established 
similarly by federating sub-ordinate components 
in different ways as occurs in the periodic table. 
This process allows contrary~complementary 
subordinate components to be selected to sustain 
the establishment of tensegrity in higher orders of  
a holarchy that allows the process to be repeated. 
No such variety is created and replicated in 
command and control organisations. They represent 
order without also possessing the variety of chaos 
required for discovering how to manage complexity 
simply and create reproducible adaptations to do  
so. The MCC illustrates ecological governance in  
a much richer way than VISA.
The creation and maintenance of holarchic 
organisations are dependent on assembling 
subcomponents that create tensegrity. As 
noted above, humans are hardwired to possess 
contrary~complementary behaviour to meet the 
test of being a Holon. Such contrary behaviour is 
not required in command and control hierarchies 
that depend upon subservience and obedience. 
This denies hierarchies accepting or using tensegrity 
to create variety to manage complexity. Individuals 
and organisations that possess tensegrity obtain 
stability~agility to cope with challenges from 
unknowable dynamic complex environments  
with the capability of adaption to sustain their 
existence. The existence of life provides the truth  
of this statement.
Another fundamental requirement for individuals 
or organisations to manage complexity is to possess 
a ‘requisite’ variety of communications and control 
channels. The profound implications of the natural 
laws of requisite variety identified by Shannon67 and 
Ashby68 are discussed in the following sections with 
their implications for hierarchical organisations.
LIMITATIONS IN MANAGING 
COMPLEXITY WITH HIERARCHIES
Theory of Firms as Hierarchies
The theory of a firm developed by Coase69 was 
limited to organisations that possessed an ‘authority 
system’, ‘master and servant’ or employer and 
employee relationship as found in command and 
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control hierarchies. Coase reasoned that such 
firms exist because instructing employees how to 
make a complex product can reduce cost more 
than transacting through market contractors for its 
components. Williamson70 developed this theory  
of hierarchical firms to create what is referred to  
as Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). Williamson71 
recognised the existence of the MCC and the 
‘dilemma’ its non-hierarchical architecture created 
for TCE. 
At a time without electronic devices, ubiquitously 
reporting bytes, Williamson72 explicitly recognised 
the importance of data processing in developing a 
theory of a firm. He stated: ‘Bounded rationality 
involves neurophysiological limits on the one hand 
and language limits on the other. The physical limits 
take the form of rate and storage limits on the 
powers of individuals to receive, store, retrieve,  
and process information without error.’ 
Williamson73 even noted that ‘groups may also 
be formed to economise information costs’. 
Williamson74 also developed ‘An information 
processing’ viewpoint to describe the need for  
multi-divisional (M-form) firms by stating: ‘the 
problem of organization is precisely one of 
decomposing the enterprise in efficient information 
processing’. Ecological governance used by nature 
achieves this objective as illustrated by VISA avoiding 
the complexity of a matrix structure and the MCC 
illustrating how to decompose decision making of  
a single board into many boards as illustrated in  
the Tables presented below. 
Coase75 also recognised that as the size of firms 
increased ‘there may be decreasing returns to 
the entrepreneur’ from ‘the costs of organising’. 
These costs include data processing in hierarchical 
firms to which the analysis was limited. Hierarchies 
develop because of the limited ability of managers 
to reliably supervise and mentor a large number of 
subordinates for whom they are directly responsible. 
To avoid information overload, managers limit their 
span of control and allow their subordinates to 
appoint sub-mangers to create a hierarchy. 
Why Hierarchies Can Only Simplify  
Complexity Incompletely
Table 1 assumes a span of control of eight 
subordinates to indicate only the size of a firm. 
The crucial assumptions made in constructing the 
table are: (1) only half the data available to lower 
level workers are communicated up the chain 
of command; and (2) errors in reporting only 
affect 15% of the data. This means the volume of 
correct data communicated to a superior becomes 
85% of 50% = 42.5%. If there are four levels of 
communications to the CEO, then the correct data 
obtained by the CEO is only 6.3%; hence 96.7% of 
the data available is missing or incorrect. 
The communication problem can be illustrated by 
the party game of ‘telephone’. In this game, a chain 
of four or more people, have to relay a message 
privately from one to another as accurately as 
possible. Even with the best intentions, the message 
reported at the end of the chain can be quite 
different from the message revealed to the audience 
at the end by the first member in the chain. 
In command and control hierarchies, where the pay 
and tenure of those reporting may be determined 
by the information being reported, a compelling 
incentive exists, consciously or unconsciously, to 
distort, bias, misreport and omit bad news. The 
missing or wrong information may have existential 
consequences for the business. This indicates why 
and how hierarchies can be prone to simplify 
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complexity incompletely and so dangerously. It could 
explain the ‘killing of the balanced scorecard’.77
Hierarchies Introduce Excessive Power to 
Facilitate Corruption Without Challenge
Another problem in hierarchies is the concentration 
of power. Corporations controlled by a single board 
of directors obtain both the power to manage the 
business and the power to govern the corporation. 
The governance powers involve: nominating 
directors, controlling meeting of shareholders who 
vote on director appointment and pay, counting  
the votes, deciding which votes are acceptable,  
and deciding how to vote open proxy forms, 
nominating, managing and paying the auditor  
who judges the accounts with absolute power 
to identify and manage systemic and operational 
conflicts of interest. 
There is no ethical commercial need for directors 
who manage businesses also to possess powers 
to govern the corporation. Separation of powers 
is a crucial condition precedent for simplifying 
complexity. It makes possible the introduction of 
distributed intelligence and decision making to 
minimise data processing overload. Systemic checks 
and balances are introduced, as are found in political 
systems that seek to promote democracy. But 
crucially the division of powers allows executives 
and the business to possess tensegrity to generate 
requisite variety to manage and adapt to complexity.
Venture capitalists provide proof that a division of 
power does not jeopardise business operations, 
even when business risks are systematically greater 
at their start-up stage. It is standard practice for 
venture capitalists to agree with shareholders to 
take over governance power in return for providing 
TABLE 176 
Hierarchies simplify complexity incompletely with errors
Decision makers lose data, information, knowledge, and wisdom of their stakeholders

















Shareholder/Minister Negligible Unreliable Unknown
Board of directors 3.1% 1.4% 98.6%
Chief Executive Officer 6.3% 3.3% 96.7% 1 1
Senior management 12.5% 7.7% 92.3% 8 9
Middle management 25.0% 18.1% 81.9% 64 73
Team leaders 50.0% 42.5% 57.5% 512 585
Workers 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 4,096 4,681
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equity funding. Some bankers, even when lending 
money with security, may also make it a condition of 
the loan that they possess some governance powers. 
These are typically vetoed powers on what their 
funds can be used for, the nomination or tenure of 
directors, and their remuneration. 
The reason why venture capitalists and bankers 
involve themselves in governance powers can be 
explained by the observation of Lord Acton:78 
Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power 
tends to corrupt absolutely. Great men are 
almost always bad men, even when they 
exercise influence and not authority, still  
more when you superadd the tendency or  
the certainty of corruption by authority.
This insight suggests that all unitary boards 
systemically facilitate corruption of their directors, 
their organisation, and so society. Corporate 
governance pioneer Tricker79 points out that unitary 
boards allow directors ‘to mark their exam papers’. 
Such systemic conflicts of self-interests are widely 
accepted in Anglophone jurisdictions and even 
promoted by so-called ‘prudential’ regulators. This 
explains why executives in such jurisdictions lose 
their moral compass to understand what is wrong 
– a point systemically highlighted by the Australian 
Royal Commission into misconduct in the banking, 
superannuation and financial services industry.80  
The costs for correcting the industry’s wrongdoing 
are expected to reach $A10 billion.81 
Hierarchies Become Subject to Groupthink
Even if conflicts of self-interest are not present, 
the efficacy of hierarchies is dependent upon the 
subservience of subordinates. Command and 
control hierarchies are dependent on obedience. 
It can be career threatening to question orders, 
introduce a variety of thought or action, and, 
especially, to become a whistleblower. This provides 
a compelling career incentive to become a team 
player by adopting ‘groupthink’. In a commissioned 
submission to the Royal Commission, Professor 
Sah82 pointed out that groupthink can lead to ‘moral 
disengagement’ . . . ‘vindicating immoral systemic 
practices’ to ‘provide exonerations for each other’.
The effect of groupthink on firm performance is 
a concern of BlackRock Inc. BlackRock is publicly 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange and is the 
biggest investor in the world with $US6.4 trillion 
under management. Its co-founder, chairman and 
CEO, Larry Fink 83 wrote to the CEOs of his investee 
companies to raise his concerns that boards of 
directors could ‘succumb to groupthink or miss new 
threats to a company’s business model’. He wanted 
‘a new model for corporate governance’, one that 
must: ‘benefit all of their stakeholders, including 
shareholders, employees, customers, and the 
communities in which they operate’. 
The idea that corporations should do no harm and 
promote the common good is not new in the US. 
‘Over several decades starting 1844, nineteen states 
amended their constitutions to make corporate 
charters subject to alteration or revocation by 
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legislatures.’ 84 In 1894, at the request of the Central 
Labor Union of New York City, the State Supreme 
Court revoked the charter of the Standard Oil 
Company of New York.85 
In contemporary times shareholders, directors, 
and managers typically see their duty to maximise 
shareholder benefits rather than share benefits with 
their stakeholders. The perception has arisen that 
stakeholder interests are subject to, or are in conflict 
with, the interest of shareholders. The power 
relations in corporate hierarchies support this view. 
A key observation of the Royal Commission86 was 
‘the asymmetry of power and information between 
financial services entities and their customers’. The 
Royal Commission87 noted that consumers were 
exploited by their financial service entities ‘because 
they could’. However, no recommendation was 
made to challenge the industry’s excess power by 
introducing elements of ecological governance, as 
illustrated in Figure 1 with details in Turnbull.88 
Similar conflicts of interest occurred in pre-modern 
societies when the short-term interests of individuals 
or groups to over exploit common good hunter-
gathering resources could deny their benefits for 
everyone. This problem is referred to as ‘the tragedy 
of the commons’. Elinor Ostrom89 was awarded the 
Nobel Prize in 2009 for identifying how a special 
type of governance architecture described as 
‘polycentric compound republics’ could avoid the 
tragedy of the commons. This ancient idea is now 
described as ‘a new way to govern’ 90 that is referred 
to as ‘ecological’ in Turnbull91 and Turnbull and 
Pirson92 for the reasons described in this article.
Hierarchies Lack Reliable Communication  
and Control Channels 
Hierarchies not only lack variety to create 
tensegrity but they also lack variety to reliably and 
simply communicate and control complexity. This 
observation, with the ‘Missing or wrong meaning’ 
shown in Table 1, is sufficient to explain why 
hierarchies are systemically unable to reliably detect 
and communicate and control complexity. It explains 
the observations of Hock cited later in this article 
and why existential risks to society have become  
a wicked problem.
Like all systems in the universe, humans depend upon 
the integrity of stability that is challenged by 
environments creating tension for change. Hierarchies, 
in the public or private sectors, not subject to 
systemic challenge become stagnant, change resistant 
bureaucracies like political dictatorships.
Shannon’s93 Law of Requisite Variety of 
communications channels to increase the reliability 
of signals as much as desired and Ashby’s94 related 
Law of Requisite Variety of control channels to 
increase the reliability of controlling complexity 
as much as desired provide the foundations for 
establishing the natural sciences of: regulation, 
cybernetics, governance, and self-governance.
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Further to the statement of Ashby95 that 
‘cybernetics has its own foundations’, he proves 
mathematically that the Law of Requisite Variety 
‘owes nothing to experiment’ or the nature of 
variety being in question or the processes of 
regulation or control.96 ‘The law states certain  
events are impossible.’97 The simplistic articulation  
of the law is intuitively sensible that ‘only variety  
can control variety’.98 More formally Ashby states 
that: ‘only variety in R [regulator] can force  
down the variety due to D [disturbance]’.
Ashby’s99 Law of Requisite Variety of control  
also means that: 
R’s capacity as a regulator cannot exceed  
R’s capacity as a channel of communication. 
In the form just given, the Law of Requisite 
Variety can be shown in exact relation  
to Shannon’s theorem 10, which says  
that if noise appears in a message, the  
amount of noise that can be removed by a 
correction channel is limited to the amount  
of information [bytes] that can be carried  
by that channel.
The implications of the laws of requisite variety 
are profound in modern societies governed 
by command and control hierarchies used by 
governments to regulate the complexity of 
businesses and individuals, or for CEOs of large 
complex organisations in the private, non-profit, 
or government sectors. It denies the ability of 
government regulators to achieve their objectives 
reliably. Likewise, the law denies CEOs of large 
complex hierarchal entities to reliably comply with 
regulators and/or to reliably establish and maintain 
quality in providing goods and/or services or 
providing benefits for ‘all stakeholders’.100 
The Law of Requisite Variety explains the insights 
of Dee Hock, the founding CEO of the credit card 
company VISA Inc. Hock101 stated: 
Industrial Age, hierarchical command  
and control pyramids of power, whether 
political, social, educational or commercial, 
were aberrations of the Industrial Age, 
antithetical to the human spirit, destructive  
of the biosphere and structurally contrary  
to the whole history and methods of  
biological evolution. They were not only  
archaic and increasingly irrelevant; there  
was a public menace.
Hierarchies exacerbate the problem of: ‘Regulating 
the very large system’102 because it is impossible 
to directly ‘amplify’ regulation. Ashby103 states that 
an amplifier ‘in general is a device that, if given a 
little of something will emit a lot of it’. ‘The Law 
of Requisite Variety, like the laws of Conservation 
of Energy, absolutely prohibits any direct and 
simple magnification but it does not prohibit 
supplementation.’104 For example, one person may 
take a day to move many heavy objects that could 
take the same person driving a crane to achieve in 
a fraction of the time by supplementing his energy 
from another source.
Ashby105 gives an example of a person wanting to 
keep the temperature of a water bath constant by 
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checking its temperature 100 times a day to create 
36,500 corrections a year. Ashby uses ‘bits’ as the 
transaction cost to make corrections directly or 
indirectly by supplementing control by acquiring 
a thermostat for which the cost in bits is minor. 
The thermostat provides a way to amplify control 
indirectly. It is through supplementing the very weak 
power of TV broadcast signals with external power 
sources that the signals become sufficiently amplified 
to communicate with humans.
How such processes can be introduced into social 
organisations is considered in the following section.
DISTRIBUTED DECISION MAKING  
IN NETWORK ORGANISATIONS
Distributed decision making creates an important 
way to simplify complexity. The MCC stakeholder 
cooperatives provide a practical example. They 
show how ecological governance decomposes 
decision making of a single board into a variety of 
control centres to introduce distributed intelligence 
and so a much richer form of democracy.
Tricker106 identifies the five main functions and 
activities of a unitary board as set out in Figure 2 .
FIGURE 2:107 Functions and activities of a unitary board 
APPOINTMENT AND REWARDING 
CHIEF EXECUTIVE
CONFORMANCE FUNCTIONS PERFORMANCE FUNCTIONS
ACCOUNTABILITY
• Reporting to shareholders
• Ensuring statutory regulatory compliance
• Reviewing audit reports
SUPERVISION
• Reviewing key executive performance
• Reviewing business results
• Monitoring budgetary control and 
corrective actions
STRATEGIC THINKING 
• Reviewing and initiating strategic analysis
• Formulating strategy
• Setting corporate direction
CORPORATE POLICY
• Approving budgets
• Determining compensation policy  
for senior executives









Short term Long term
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FIGURE 3:108 Functions and activities of Mondragón compound board 
In a MCC stakeholder cooperative the five functions 
and activities of a unitary board are distributed to 
five separate decision-making centres, as shown 
in Figure 3. Each centre becomes elements of a 
‘compound board’ as defined in Turnbull.109 Figure 4 
compares the workload of each of the five elements 
of the compound board with a single board typical 
of Anglophone cultures. It reveals how the workload 
of a unitary board is distributed over all members 
of the firm to create bottom-up and outside-in 
feedback to the traditional top-down process. 
There can be many different ‘work units’ that make 
decisions on relative pay rates of their members. 
These self-managing units could also be described  
as ‘polycentric’ republics or a ‘holon’. They appoint 
delegates to the social council that is itself a 
compound board. In this way, individuals, work  
units, and the social council become part of a 
holarchy. The firm, its cooperative group, and the 
MCC each represent a self-managing entity that  
can be described as ‘polycentric compound 
republics’. Alternatively, they could be described as  
a holarchy created by ecological governance. Each 
level takes on different roles along the lines cited  





Invites external intervention  
by bank and/or Group
WORK UNIT
Production, pay relativities, appoints 
delegates to Social council
SUPERVISORY BOARD 
Strategic stakeholders appoint 
and direct management board
SOCIAL COUNCIL
Working conditions,  
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FIGURE 4:111 Mondragón compound board compared with unitary board
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Internalb X X X X XXXX
Externalb X X XX
Short termb X X X XXX
Long termb X X XX
Degree of decomposition of information processing labour indicated by allocations of ‘X’
a Omits the General Assembly, which elects Watchdog Council and Supervisory board;
b Descriptions follows typology of R. I. Tricker, Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices
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When a MCC firm grows in size to beyond 
manageable human neurological limits112, it divides 
into two like an amoeba. One firm then becomes 
a supplier or customer of the other. This creates 
a lateral division of decision-making labour. It also 
contributes to creating groups of firms that share 
some functions like accounting and marketing 
through a cooperative of the cooperative group. 
The MCC now has a number of these cooperative 
groups, each with its internal system of network 
governance to share the functions of up to a dozen 
or so firms like a Keiretsu group.113 The cooperative 
groups are then federated at a third level of the 
holarchy to create the MCC as illustrated and 
described in Turnbull.114
How the concept of holons radically simplifies  
and explains the complexity of the 200 firms in  
the MCC system is demonstrated in a ‘Table 6.1, 
Holon typology of Mondragón’.115 The possibility  
of using the architecture of nature to govern 
humanity to preserve both nature and humanity  
is articulated in Turnbull,116, 117 in a way to that could 
also establish: ‘government of the people, by the 
people, for the people’.118
The existence of the MCC in Europe, the John  
Lewis Partnership in the UK, and VISA international 
in the US provides evidence that network governed 
firms with an ecological communication and  
control architecture can be established without  
any changes in the law in major jurisdictions.  
How the insights and concepts demonstrated in  
such firms could be introduced to simplify the 
complexity of publicly traded firms, large private 
firms, non-profits, and government owned firms  
is next considered.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR SYSTEMICALLY 
SIMPLIFYING ORGANISATIONAL 
COMPLEXITY
This section considers how elements of ecological 
governance could be systematically introduced to 
publicly traded firms, large private organisation, non-
profit organisations and government bureaucracies. 
The incentive to do so is to improve operations 
by increasing the ability of organisations to reliably 
simplify complexity comprehensively. Another 
incentive is to eliminate and mitigate the systemic 
conflicts of interest in hierarchies. Governments 
have an incentive to adopt ecological governance to 
minimise the size, cost, and complexity that alienates 
voters. Government departments, corporations, and 
agencies could become role models119 to ironically 
remove key arguments for privatisation. It would 
introduce ‘Associational Democracy’120 to augment 
and reinforce legislative democracy. 
Neither economic markets nor simple hierarchies 
occur in nature. Nature survives and excels by 
using variety introduced by tensegrity to produce 
competition for survival. Tensegrity is both denied 
and discouraged in hierarchies. A condition 
precedent for introducing tensegrity is to separate 
the power to manage from the power to govern, as 
shown in Figure 1. This shows both a ‘Management 
board’ and a ‘Board of governors’. Turnbull121 has 
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twice introduced this arrangement in enterprises he 
has founded. It allowed him to negotiate exceptions 
from the law with the regulator because superior 
investor protection was introduced. It provided an 
example of how to introduce a systemic process 
for de-regulation by introducing elements of self-
governance that is an intrinsic feature of ecological 
governance.122 
Regulators are created to protect stakeholders.  
It makes political sense to make regulators 
accountable to KPIs set by stakeholders, as indicated 
in Figure 1. Governments could then determine the 
remuneration and tenure of its regulators subject to 
them meeting stakeholder KPIs. It would encourage 
regulators to adequately resource stakeholders to 
become co-regulators, as indicated in Figure 1 and 
described in Turnbull.123 This would also protect 
responsible Ministers and the Government. 
How elements of ecological governance could be 
introduced in various types of large complex 
organisations is indicated in Figure 1, which features 
generic illustration of ecological governance with 
stakeholders as co-regulators. Polycentric self-
managing stakeholder organisations, as illustrated  
on the left-hand side of Figure 1, could be introduced 
by changes in the constitution and by-laws of 
corporate entities such as achieved by Turnbull.124 
Stakeholder forums introduce the ‘requisite variety’ 
of both communication and control channels to 
crosscheck augment and mentor management as 
much as desired by increasing the density of their 
networks. The detailed steps for their introduction 
are inspired by the Citizen Utility Boards (CUBs) 
introduced by Ralph Nader to reduce regulatory 
capture in the US125.
Evidence of CUB efficacy is their existence decades 
later (details are provided in Turnbull).126,127 The 
operating advantages for shareholders, directors, 
managers, auditors, and stakeholders are detailed 
in Turnbull.128 The ‘bottom–up’ stakeholder 
associations in Figure 1, represent holons or the 
‘polycentric’ self-governing ‘republics’ referred to by 
Ostrom129 and Ostrom and Allen.130 The stakeholder 
boards jointly establish a compound board, as 
shown in Figure 1 to provide political processes to 
manage the various conflicts of interest between 
investors and stakeholders and between different 
stakeholders. It is these conflicts that introduce 
tensions to create tensegrity to maintain cooperative 
checks and balances to avoid and mitigate tragedies 
of common corporate interests. 
Figure 1 represents ‘a new model of corporate 
governance’ needed for Fink131 to achieve his 
objective of firms benefiting all stakeholders. As 
revealed by the Ostroms, it is an ancient form  
of governance. Organisations that promote benefits  
for all their stakeholders become a common good.132 
In this way, global firms could become an instrument 
for promoting global common goods such as cleaner 
air, water, oceans, and healthy environments for 
nurturing bio-diversity to maintain humanity  
and the wellbeing of the planet. 
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The alternative was articulated by Hock133 nine years 
before the 2008 global financial crisis, who noted: 
We are experiencing a global epidemic of 
institutional failure that knows no bounds. 
We must seriously question the concepts 
underlying the current structures of 
organization, and whether they are suitable to 
the management of accelerating societal and 
environmental problems – and, even beyond 
that, we must seriously consider whether they 
are the primary source of those problems.
The problem of avoiding the ‘global epidemic 
of institutional failure’ is becoming much more 
pronounced in the current century as complexity 
accelerates. This paper provides insights as to why 
this so and how they can be overcome. The solution 
depends upon this knowledge being shared and 
applied. The insights of this paper demonstrate, that 
it is impossible for governments, their regulators or 
private sector CEOs of large organisations to reliably 
and comprehensively regulate complexity relying 
solely on their current top-down systems. 
The Australian Royal Commission referred to 
above failed to recognise this point submitted by 
Turnbull134 and so failed to identify both the root 
causes and systemic solution to the problems 
they were investigating. This systemic problem of 
hierarchies is also being investigated by Australian 
Royal Commissions into: ‘Aged care Quality and 
Safety’ in 2018, and ‘Violence, Abuse, Neglect and 
Exploitation of People with Disabilities’ in 2019.135
The challenge for society, and especially for 
schools of business or government, is that their 
implicit assumption that command and control 
hierarchies represent the natural order of things is 
the fundamental cause of existential risks; a belief 
reinforced by the dominance of monotheism. 
This may explain why the theory and practice of 
designing corporate charters to introduce elements 
of ecological governance remains an intellectual  
black hole. 
The authors pioneered the first MBA unit in  
the world that provided education on how to 
evaluate and design network governed organisations 
at Macquarie University in 2003. Elements of our 
course were introduced to graduate law students 
at the Swiss International Law School in 2015. 
Columbia Law Professor Katharina Pistor developed 
the course with Turnbull136 being required reading 
with a video introduction by Turnbull.137 The  
authors would welcome the opportunity to  
assist scholars and educational institutions in 
developing similar courses that could also be  
used to extend management education to  
managing global problems.
The importance of this article was highlighted by  
the US Business Roundtable138 which announced 
on 18 August 2019 that 181 of its CEOs had 
committed ‘to lead their companies for the benefit 
of all stakeholders – customers, employee, suppliers, 
communities and shareholders’. While the BlackRock 
CEO was a signatory, there is no mention of his 
proposal for 'a new model of corporate governance' 
cited by authors. CEOs committed to many 
stakeholders would be accountable to no one. This 
would undermine shareholder primacy, a feature 
that is preserved by the authors in their Figure 1.
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